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Abstract
The logic of ‘being informed’ gives a formal analysis of a cognitive
state that does not coincide with either belief, or knowledge. To Floridi,
who first proposed the formal analysis, the latter is supported by the
fact that unlike knowledge or belief, being informed is a factive, but not
a reflective state. This paper takes a closer look at the formal analysis
itself, provides a pure and an applied semantics for the logic of being
informed, and tries to find out to what extent the formal analysis can
contribute to an information-based epistemology.
1 introduction
In Floridi [2006] it is argued that the statal relation of an agent a holding
the information that p could correctly be formalised as Iap, where Ia is a
KTB box-operator. This means that being informed is, in the first place,
characterised as a state which is veridical (one is informed that p only if
p is true; in short: Iap → p), but not reflective or introspective (being
informed does not imply being informed that one is informed). In addition,
the interpretation is claimed to satisfy a sort of constructibility principle
which is associated with the Brouwerian axiom p → Ia¬Ia¬p. Given this
analysis, it is concluded that the logic of Ia does not coincide with any of
the logics that are traditionally thought of as logics of knowledge or belief.
The main value of this insight is, according to Floridi, that it shows that
being informed is neither knowing (yet) nor (just) believing. Following the
rejection of any tri-partite analysis of knowledge in Floridi [2004b], this
insight is a first step towards a new information-based and non-doxastic
analysis of knowledge.
The case for a KTB-analysis of being informed is strictly speaking inde-
pendent from the broader suggestion that being informed is equivalent to
neither knowing nor believing. In other words, one can assent to the latter
while rejecting the former. The other direction is, at least in its general
form, harder to resist. The view that knowledge, belief, and being informed
are three different cognitive states is Floridi’s main target. Call this the
basic independence thesis. Unless common logical analyses of knowledge
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and belief are fundamentally mistaken, this thesis is implied by the KTB-
analysis. Still, there are two other independence theses (or conjectures)
that are as relevant as the basic one that is implicitly endorsed by Floridi.
The first one aims at the difference between first-order knowledge and first-
order information; that is, the difference in extension between knowledge
and information of non-epistemic facts. The second one aims (with roughly
the same first-order focus) at the difference between information and true
belief. If we’re interested in how the KTB-analysis relates to these indepen-
dence theses, it is the second one which poses the most serious challenge.1
Call this one the strong independence thesis.
On a more general level, we could say that the philosophical defence
of an information-based reconstruction of epistemology should at least in-
clude (a) the basic independence thesis, (b) the strong independence thesis,
and (c) the more general non-mentalistic motivations for such an episte-
mology. Ideally, each of these should at least get some support from the
KTB-analysis, but (a*) while the original version supports the basic indepen-
dence thesis, (b*) it does not at all support the strong independence thesis,
and (c*) its implementation of being informed as a non-mentalistic state is
questionable as well. The main reason why the original KTB-analysis does
a poor job is its purely syntactical formulation. In section 2, this diagnosis
of the mismatch between the KTB-analysis and its philosophical ambition
is analysed in a two-pronged fashion. First, it is concluded that a mere syn-
tactic formulation of the KTB-analysis provides an insufficient basis for the
more interesting independence theses; second, it is argued that a seman-
tic presentation of the KTB-analysis requires a non-standard interpretation
of informational accessibility. Fortunately, neither of these constitutes an
insurmountable obstacle.
The move to a model-theoretic presentation of the logic of being in-
formed is only a first step towards the further integration of an information-
based epistemology and the KTB-analysis. That is, given the model-theory
or pure semantics for a slightly weakened—non-normal—version of the
logic of being informed that I propose in section 3, it remains to be shown
that such a model theory admits an interpretation that is itself in line with
the notion it intends to model. A first stab at an applied or so-called de-
praved semantics is based on the de dicto reading of data and a notion of
information based on it. The resulting sentential approach is based on the
suggestion that information can only be derived from one’s truthful data.
This proposal is described, and ultimately rejected in section 4. A more
refined interpretation of being informed that is based on a de re reading
of data is introduced in section 5. This final proposal succeeds where the
others fail: it shows that the KTB-analysis can be brought in line with an
1One reason for this is that one can still maintain that knowledge implies belief whereas
being informed does not. This move is, at least in principle, available to anyone interested
in an information-based epistemology because even if the tri-partite analysis of knowledge
is beyond repair, knowledge can still as a matter of fact imply belief.
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information based epistemology by (a) exploiting the open-endedness of
de re data to account for the opacity of being informed and (b) imposing
a weak modal constraint on being informed (the impossibility to rule out
the actual world) over and above the non-modal condition that information
cannot be derived from false data. While this is sufficient to defend the
KTB-analysis, it also reveals that the logic of being informed and the philo-
sophical program it is meant to support do not always interact as envisaged
in Floridi [2006].
2 being informed and the ktb-analysis
The original case for the KTB-analysis, as it is given in Floridi [2006], is
exclusively based on the examination of a number of characteristic axioms.
As a consequence, all the argument shows is that the logic for being in-
formed is at least as strong as KTB, but strictly weaker than S5. This is
important to keep in mind, as it reveals that while an appropriate model-
theory for the logic of being informed should validate all KTB-theorems
and provide counter-examples for S5-theorems that are KTB-invalid, there
is no need for KTB to be complete with respect to that model-theory.
These requirements are still too strong. A closer examination of the
reasons why being informed should be formalised by means of a normal
modal logic reveals that only the weak necessitation-rule (all theorems of
propositional logic are necessarily true) is in fact required. As a result, an
appropriate model-theory for being informed should still warrant a notion
of being informed for so-called Cartesian Agents, but there is no need for
an informational counterpart of the principle of strong logical omniscience
(Girle [2000: 10.4]). The admissibility of a particular kind of non-normal
modal logics is not just a frivolous option; a natural way of modelling being
informed (section 3) gives us just that. This is why the logic for being
informed not only needs to be revisited (in virtue of the lack of a proper
model-theory), but is also in need of revision.
	 	 	
One might point out that, independently of how we model higher-order in-
formation (iterated Ia’s), there is a more obvious sense in which the logic
of being informed would differ from more common logics for belief (and,
a fortiori, for true belief). After all, it is well known that if, as Dretske
[1999] has it, information requires the satisfaction of some dependency
conditions, it cannot be closed under known (alternatively, informed) im-
plication.2 If, unlike being informed, true belief does satisfy this form of
closure, the stronger independence thesis we’re after immediately follows.
2See Adams [forthcoming] where the logic of being informed is contrasted with the Dret-
skian program, and Arlo Costa & Parikh [2006] where a neighbourhood semantics is used to
model this kind of knowledge. Note also that the rejection of closure under known implica-
tion goes back to Dretske [1970] where the notion of information isn’t even mentioned.
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Still, it becomes quite clear in Floridi [forthcoming] that—apart from the
veridicality thesis—the logic of being informed was never meant to capture
this more demanding notion. Indeed, being informed that p as holding the
information that p is just holding a piece of information; where the latter
is to be understood as a truthful and meaningful well-formed datum. But
what is then the difference between being informed that p and having a
true belief that p? The main reason for keeping these distinct is that the
latter includes a mental state whereas the former doesn’t.3 As emphasised
by Floridi (pc), this is a good reason to refrain from modelling one after
the other. While the philosophical motivation for this difference is easily
grasped, it is not as easy to see how this difference should be reflected
within a formal system. In addition, this does not have to mean that the
difference can be reduced to telling mental and non-mental states apart.
There could also be a difference in ways of being truthful.
According to Floridi [2005a], information is truth-constituted. Unlike
mere propositional contents, on which the truth-value supervenes, pieces
of information encapsulate their veridicality. One challenge for the logic
of being informed is to explain how this relates to the KTB-analysis (or
some close relative of this analysis). The relevance of this idea of truth-
encapsulation draws on the fact that being informed is meant to be a (the)
stepping stone to knowledge that, in view of the Gettier-counterexamples,
mere (true) belief cannot be (Floridi [2004b]). In spite of its broader im-
portance, the original formulation of the KTB-analysis does not sufficiently
clarify how being informed can play this role. The lesson we learn from the
KTB-analysis is that information is truthful whereas mere beliefs need not
be, and that beliefs are introspective whereas information is not. Neither of
these, however, leads to a positive characterisation of information vis-à-vis
true belief. This much needed positive characterisation largely coincides
with the stronger independence thesis mentioned in the introduction.4
	 	 	
One problem with the KTB-analysis of being informed is that superficial
matches between the philosophical and the formal side of the story can be
misleading. Here, I want to look at a first sense in which the original KTB-
analysis can only scratch at the surface of what it means to be informed,
and reveal how this affects the prospects of that analysis. Put simply, the
problem is that the original analysis cannot see beyond the syntactical sur-
face of the axiomatic presentation. What this hints at is that Floridi came to
3By way of comparison, Dunn thinks of information as “what is left from knowledge when
you subtract, justification, truth, belief (. . . ) [and] the thinker” [2008: 581]. Floridi would
presumably agree with all but the omission of truth. Still, the contrast is crucial, for on
Dunn’s account information is any kind of semantic content (which is fine for a logician),
whereas for Floridi it is much less generic (but more useful for doing epistemology).
4One should, however, keep in mind that it is not all that obvious that the framework of
basic modal logic in which the KTB-analysis is formulated has the necessary resources to
establish the stronger result.
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the KTB-analysis through the examination of modal axioms. He proceeded
by elimination, and settled on a particular set of axioms in virtue of the
mutual agreement between what one could call the surface behaviour of
being informed and an imprecise interpretation of each of these axioms.
Proceeding along these lines is like working in the dark. This is typical
for the practice of reverse-engineering (in other papers, Floridi uses exactly
that term to describe his practice), where one takes an existing approach
(modal logics for cognitive states like knowledge and belief) and tries to
apply it to a new domain (being informed).
Initially, this kind of reverse-engineering does not seem all that differ-
ent from the usual practice of formal modelling where one can either opt
for a syntactically, or for a semantically driven approach.5 There is noth-
ing fundamentally wrong with either of these options, but what I want to
point out is that—at least in their standard form—none of these options is
particularly well-suited to establish the intended independence theses.
First, consider the syntactical approach. Here, there are two kinds of
problems. One is due to the fact that a difference in logical axioms for the
notions of being informed, (true) belief and knowledge indicates a differ-
ence, but not yet a way to positively characterise being informed versus
truly believing. A second one is due to the fact that since we’re work-
ing in the dark, we do not know where the difference comes from. Here,
one could reply that there is a more encompassing motivation behind the
KTB-analysis which does explain this difference, and adds a positive char-
acterisation. The problem with the syntactical approach,6 is that there is
no way to find out if the difference that arises from the logical analysis
does in fact reflect the kind of difference that is presupposed by this more
encompassing story.
This last point can be clarified by appealing to the difference between
a pure and an applied semantics (Plantinga [1974], Copeland [1983]), and
in particular to the fact that only applied semantics can play a philosoph-
ical (as opposed to a merely formal) role. Pure semantics come in many
forms, but applied semantics are constrained by the need to give an inter-
pretation of the formal apparatus in terms of non-formal terms that are
directly related to the intended use of the logic in question. In this case
the intended use as well as the relevant non-formal terms are to a certain
extent already in place. The KTB-analysis includes arguments for each of
the relevant axioms and thereby implicitly fixes the non-formal terms. The
main difficulty at this point is that if we don’t even have a formal or pure
semantics, there is no way to find out if the KTB-analysis can be used as
a basis for an applied semantics for the logic in question. As a result, we
5This distinction is relevant for and used by formally oriented logicians (see Blackburn,
De Rijke & Venema [2001: 1.7]) as well as more philosophically oriented ones (see Girle
[2000: 10.4]).
6I assume here that the syntactical approach cannot provide the kind of positive char-
acterisation of information versus true belief, and therefore further ignore that aspect and
focus on the negative characterisation induced by the lack of introspection.
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cannot be sure that the agreement between the intended interpretation of
being informed and its formal analysis extends below the surface of the
axiomatic presentation.
The semantical approach has the formal resources to avoid the prob-
lems of the syntactical approach, but it also has problems of its own. Con-
sider, for that purpose, the standard epistemic interpretation of Kripke-
style semantics. On that account, a knows that p just if p is true in all al-
ternative ‘worlds’ that a cannot distinguish from the actual one. The state
of being informed, by contrast, cannot as easily be related to the informed
agent’s ability to discriminate alternative states of the world.7 Indeed, if
being informed that p is just a matter of having true, well-formed and
meaningful data for p, there is no reason to assume that such a state has
any of the relevant modal properties. This insight poses a serious problem
if we want to make sense of a semantic approach to (the KTB-analysis of)
being informed, but it does not yet imply that such an approach is impos-
sible. What it does show is that, first, we need an account of informational
accessibility that does not directly refer to an informee’s own ability to tell
alternative states of the world apart. Second, once we have such an ac-
count, it is not yet clear whether it can do the explanatory work we would
like it to do. Namely, to characterise the difference between information,
knowledge and belief (as it is presupposed by the KTB-analysis) from a
model-theoretic perspective. What I mean by this is that if informational
accessibility is substantially different from epistemic and doxastic acces-
sibility, it immediately follows that iterated I’s cannot or should not be
compared to the iterated K’s or B’s in the respective logical systems, and
that therefore the invalidity of Iap → IaIap is not directly related to the
non-reflective or non-introspective nature of being informed.
	 	 	
At this point, one might be tempted to base the semantic interpretation of
being informed on information-sets, and thus map each axiom to a postu-
late about what does and does not belong to an agent’s information-set Ia.
As such, the validity of Iap → p is understood as p ∈ Ia ⇒ p (p belongs to
a’s information-set only if p is true), and the invalidity of Iap → IaIap as
p ∈ Ia h Iap ∈ Ia. This approach is familiar from the belief-revision liter-
ature where the generalised inclusion of reflective modalities in belief-sets
is shown to clash with the presumed conservativity of revisions (Fuhrmann
[1989]). When it comes to the Brouwerian axiom, this kind of approach
turns out to be problematic for entirely different reasons. The dilemma it
poses is the following. Either p → I¬I¬p is understood as p ⇒ ¬Ia¬p ∈ Ia,
or as p ⇒ Ia¬p ∉ Ia. Neither is, however, acceptable. The former is consis-
tent with our interpretation of veridicality and non-reflectivity, but comes
7For otherwise the “margin for error principle” given in Williamson [2000: Chapt. 5 &
Appendix 2] would, given that it warrants a KTB-analysis of knowledge, perfectly serve our
purpose.
Pre-print -- Please cite published version
The Logic of ‘Being Informed’ Revisited and Revised 7
with an unwanted introspective flavour. The latter avoids this introspec-
tive flavour, but is based on a weaker interpretation of the Brouwerian ax-
iom which cannot be generalised to the interpretation of the other axioms.
As a consequence, if we assume that there should be a single procedure
to transform axioms of the KTB-analysis into constraints on information-
sets, it turns out that there is no uniform information-set interpretation
that vindicates the whole KTB-analysis.
Before we move on, let me just stress that the above is not meant to
imply that the KTB-analysis is itself beyond repair. Rather, the suggestion
is that its syntactical formulation does not decisively support either form
of the independence thesis, while its semantical formulation cannot be a
simple modification of an epistemic alternatives interpretation. The main
reason for this is that information is no longer the generic notion most lo-
gicians like to think about, and which is based on the identification of the
information an agent holds with its semantic content (a proposition or in-
tention), but something more specific. Unlike other discussions of strongly
semantic information, the original KTB-analysis does not account for this
specificity, and (as already suggested in fn. 4) it is not yet clear whether that
specificity is even expressible in the language of basic modal logic. Even if
it lacked the relevant resources, the KTB-analysis would perhaps not yet
be refuted, but it would for sure lose much of its appeal. The inclusion
of the Brouwerian axiom would come under pressure, and the logic for be-
ing informed (presumably weakened to the logic T or even S0.5) would be
reduced to what knowledge and true belief have in common.
3 a ‘pure’ semantics for the ktb-analysis
Using formal methods for philosophical purposes requires us to be atten-
tive to the contrast between so-called ‘pure semantics’ and ‘applied seman-
tics’ (cfr. the remarks in the previous section). Even if it is not our goal to
characterise the meaning of ‘being informed’ in natural language, the fact
that our semantics is meant to support a philosophical analysis of being in-
formed is itself sufficient to warrant the demand for an applied semantics.
With this proviso in mind, I shall still proceed by first formulating a formal
model-theory for the logic of being informed. The latter will then be used
as a guide to obtain the intended real semantics for being informed.
The language L for the logic of being informed is inductively defined as:
φ ::= p | ⊥ | ¬φ | φ1 ∨φ2 | Iaφ
where p ranges over a set of propositional parameters Prop, and a ranges
over a set of agentsA.
A model for being informed is a 4-tuple M = (S,@, I,‖·‖M) where S is
a non-empty set of points, @ a designated element of S, I a set of binary
relations Ia on S for each a ∈ A, and ‖·‖M a map Prop , P(S). Finally, we
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say that a formula of L is satisfied at a point in a model iff it complies with
the usual recursive clauses:
1. M, s ð φ iff s ∈ ‖φ‖M, for φ ∈ Prop,
2. M, s ð⊥ never,
3. M, s ð ¬φ iff M, s ú φ,
4. M, s ð φ1 ∨φ2 iff M, s ð φ1 or M, s ð φ2,
5. M, s ð Iaφ iff sIas′ implies M, s′ ð φ.
This means that the specificity of this logic has to surface in the properties
of I as well as in the role we impute on @. The minimal properties of
informational accessibility are the following:
@Ia@ (R)
@Ias → sIa@ (S)
If, in addition, validity is defined as satisfaction at @ for all models, it
is a standard exercise to check that the KTB-axioms come out valid, while
Iaφ→ IaIaφ and ¬Iaφ→ Ia¬Iaφ remain invalid. By contrast, since informa-
tional accessibility is only reflexive and symmetric where @ is involved, the
informational counterpart of the rule of strong necessitation is not sound
on this semantics. The rule of weak necessitation is retained in virtue of
the fact that validity is only evaluated at @, which by definition is a normal
world (cfr. the contrast between the non-normal S-systems and the even
weaker E-systems).
From this, it follows that Ia is a box-like modality of a non-normal logic
that is strictly stronger than Lemmon’s S0.5 wherein φ means that φ
is tautological (Lemmon [1959], Cresswell [1966]). The resulting logic is
also the non-normal pendant of the normal modal logic KTB. In view of
the comments made in section 2, we may thus conclude that the present
model-theory agrees with the (appropriately weakened) KTB-analysis of be-
ing informed (further results as well as an axiomatic presentation of this
system are not required for our purposes).
4 a sentential interpretation
Being informed that p not only means having data for p, but requires hav-
ing veridical data for p (Floridi [2006: 2.2]). This simple remark, together
with the assumption that data can be identified with their syntactical repre-
sentations (see e.g. Floridi [2005b: 1.3]), is the basic insight we need to turn
our pure semantics into an applied semantics. As for most other modal
logics, we have an applied semantics when the notions of (informational)
alternative, (informational) accessibility, and actual world are not just the
set-theoretical constructs used in the previous section, but do correspond
to something real. In other words, it does not suffice to say that when sIas′
we say that for a the world s′ is informationally accessible from s, and that
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therefore s′ is an informational alternative to s for a. The proposal set out
in this section is based on three distinct considerations.
First, when we say that validity is evaluated at @ we mean that valid-
ity is only evaluated at the actual world, which in its turn means that the
properties of being informed are identified with its properties at the actual
world. This does not say much yet, but for now it suffices to mention that
this agrees with the idea that being informed has only few modal prop-
erties; being informed is hardly more than having true data. To this we
only need to add that what counts as the actual world can be understood
quite loosely—all that matters is that it includes the situation or system the
relevant agent is said to be informed about.
Second, when we say that s is an informational alternative to @ for the
agent a, the related notion of informational accessibility has to be under-
stood from a third-person perspective. This point is related to the sugges-
tion in Floridi [forthcoming] that knowledge and information might almost
coincide from a first-person perspective, but is best generalised to the idea
that being informed does not require the access and/or the transparency
that is typically associated with first-person perspectives. The latter can
then be translated into the claim that the information held by an agent
(who does not necessarily have access to the content of said information)
does not have to be reflected in what, from a first-person perspective, that
agent considers to be possible given the information he holds.
The third and final consideration is that when information is truthful
data,8 informational accessibility should be a function of the truthful data
an agent holds. This suggestion does not yet pick out a single relation of
informational accessibility, for the expression “the truthful data an agent
holds” remains ambiguous. To resolve this ambiguity we need to decide
whether truthful data that are inferred from false data still counts as in-
formation. If the relation of being informed is immune to Gettier-style
counterexamples—which it purportedly is—, one would think that informa-
tion can only be inferred from other information. This “no false premises”
commitment (see e.g. Shope [1979])9 implies that the sentential approach
to being informed needs to distinguish between basic and derivative data.
I won’t argue in favour of that distinction, but just note that from a formal
point of view this leads to something that’s closer to belief-bases than to
belief-sets whereas from a philosophical point of view this does not have
to commit us to a foundationalist rather than to a coherentist notion of
justification because, quite simply, that distinction does not apply here.
8Strongly semantic information is standardly defined as true, well-formed and mean-
ingful data. Given the assumption that all basic data are sentences of a suitable formal
language, all such data are well-formed and meaningful by definition.
9We might expect that objections to this kind of restrictions as a means to avoid Gettier-
counterexamples (Feldman [1974]) carry over to the present proposal. I shall ignore this
issue here, but only remark that the analogy is only partial: Gettier-counterexamples pre-
suppose a fallible account of justification, but being informed is entirely independent from
this justificatory aspect.
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Using the above, we may say that an agent a is informed that φ when
the truthful part of his basic data (a’s basic information, for short) implies
φ (compare with Shin [1993]). Perhaps, due to the requirement that φ
should be a logical consequence of a’s basic information this is, at least
in general, all too restrictive. Recall, however, that we only want to gain a
better understanding of the KTB-analysis of being informed, and that this
restricted aim does not include solving the sceptical problem. What matters
is that the basic information held by a immediately determines the relation
of informational accessibility. Where ∆ is a’s basic information, each world
where all of ∆ is true is an informational alternative to the actual world. If
‖·‖M is used to denote the set of worlds (in a model) where a formula or
sets of formulae is true,10 the sentential interpretation of being informed
can be conveniently summarised as follows:
1. Where Γ is the basic data held by a,
2. the basic information held by a is ∆ = {φ ∈ Γ : @ ð φ},
3. s is informationally accessible from @ when s ∈ ‖∆‖M, and
4. a is informed that φ when ‖∆‖M⊆ ‖φ‖M.
Strictly speaking, the fourth condition above does not coincide with the
requirement that φ has to be a logical consequence of ∆. To capture the
latter, the relevant condition would have to be true in all models. Defining
being informed relative to a single model is nevertheless a sensible option;
especially if we don’t want to consider all worlds that are consistent with
an agent’s basic information. A single model will do for present purposes,
and we thereby weaken the initial proposal by stipulating that a is informed
that φ if (in the appropriate model) φ follows from a’s basic information.
That is, if a’s basic information excludes all non φ worlds. As we can
ignore the sceptical problem, we do not have to specify which models are
appropriate.
	 	 	
As an interpretation of the pure semantics of the previous section this ap-
proach has two virtues, but also one major drawback. A first virtue is
that we have a natural interpretation which links the definition of strongly
semantic information to the reflexivity of the relation of informational ac-
cessibility. The second virtue is that it supports the strong independence
thesis. Finally, the main drawback of a sentential approach is that it is in-
complete: the four conditions given above do not settle what counts as an
informational alternative to s where s , @. What is worse is that the most
plausible conditions for informational accessibility at non-actual worlds are
at odds with the KTB-analysis. The reflexivity of informational accessibility
is straightforward, but the second virtue as well as the problem of informa-
tional accessibility at non-actual worlds deserve a closer look.
10I.e. ‖·‖M is ‘lifted’ from a function from propositional parameters to sets of worlds to a
function from (sets of) formulae to sets of worlds.
Pre-print -- Please cite published version
The Logic of ‘Being Informed’ Revisited and Revised 11
Consider the strong independence thesis. How do information and true
belief compare? The present model does not as such specify what a be-
lieves, but if a’s basic data are understood as the set of a’s basic beliefs
it is reasonable to assume that if φ follows from these basic beliefs, φ is
at least an implicit belief we may ascribe to a. Finally, for φ to be a true
belief it only has to be true at the actual world. This agrees with the differ-
ence we already aimed at: true beliefs may be grounded in false ones, but
information may not be grounded in false data. How does this difference
surface within the modal logics that are adequate for each of these no-
tions? A rough answer is that they both satisfy the same T-axiom because
informational as well as (lets call it) t-doxastic accessibility are reflexive. A
more specific answer is that s is t-doxastically accessible from @ whenever
it belongs to ‖Γ‖M ∪ @,11 and that it is informationally accessible when it
belongs to ‖∆‖M. This settles the strong independence thesis in, admit-
tedly, a rather trivial way. Still, it also makes the more subtle point that
at least this difference has no effect on what counts as the right logic for
both notions, and thereby enforces our previous remark that the strong
independence thesis cannot be settled in a purely axiomatic setting.
Now, consider the issue of what is informationally accessible at non-
actual worlds. Expanding on how we settled this question for the actual
world, we should expect this to be a function of the basic information held
by an agent at the relevant non-actual world. Despite its simplicity, the
question of what qualifies as information at a non-actual (but information-
ally accessible) world is not as easily answered. The straightforward solu-
tion is that it should be exclusively determined by which data are true at
that non-actual world. An equally defensible alternative is that the agent’s
information remains fixed; only truth at the actual world matters. For-
tunately, we do not need to debate about the respective virtues of each
of these proposals, but only need to note that where ∆ and ∆′ are, respec-
tively, a’s information at the actual world and at the non-actual world, both
these proposals still ensure that ∆ ⊆ ∆′ and hence ‖∆′‖ ⊆ ‖∆‖ which is
equivalent to the transitivity of the relation of informational accessibility.12
The main insight we gain from the above result is that the KTB-analysis
requires that, for the failure of transitivity of informational accessibility,
there be informationally accessible non-actual worlds where some of the
basic information a holds at the actual world no longer counts as infor-
mation. By the same token, the symmetry of informational accessibility
requires that one’s information at these non-actual worlds would not ex-
clude the actual world; i.e. that at those worlds one could not be informed
of something that is actually false (or inconsistent with what is actually
true). Using this description, one indeed obtains an interpretation of the
11To see that this duly captures the above description of true beliefs, just note that (‖Γ‖M∪
@) ⊆ ‖φ‖M holds iff ‖Γ‖M ⊆ ‖φ‖M and @ ⊆ ‖φ‖M hold separately, which are equivalent to,
respectively, Γ îM φ (Γ strictly implies φ in model M) and @ ð φ.
12Compare with the embedding of intuitionistic logic in the modal logic S4.
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pure semantics set out in the previous section.
One way to make this more precise is to specify non-actual information
very tightly along the just described lines. As such, a’s information at s
can be any subset of his data which (i) are true at s, and (ii) are consistent
with what is true at @.13 This is at best an ad hoc solution, as it does not
yet explain why some of a’s actual information might, despite being true,
fail to qualify as information at s. Another, more radical way out specifies
that at non-actual worlds one is not informed at all. Despite its formal
elegance,14 this alternative is equally hard to motivate. Nevertheless, this
is the best we can achieve within the present setting, and so it seems that
we have once more reached the limits of what can be achieved within a
particular framework.
	 	 	
In section 2 I emphasised the problems that arise from a purely syntactical
characterisation of the logic for being informed. Here I take a closer look
at the limitations of the sentential interpretation of the model-theory de-
scribed in section 3. One thing that has become clear from the attempts
to characterise an agent’s basic information as a set of sentences is that
once we extend an otherwise natural sentential proposal to informationally
accessible worlds, we quickly reach the limits of what can be explained in
such a setting. The problem faced by the sentential approach is structurally
similar to the previous one: some distinctions we need to make cannot eas-
ily be accommodated by our formalism, and when we can accommodate
these differences there is no guarantee that we capture the intended differ-
ence.
The problem can, at least to a first approximation, be traced back to a
lingering commitment to the generic notion of information as mere seman-
tical content (what Floridi [2004a] refers to as weakly semantic informa-
tion). Clearly, if an agent’s basic data are identified with a body of semantic
content, and if at each world a subset of that content (its truthful part)
is used to determine the set of informationally accessible worlds (strictly
speaking, the content is just the set of informationally accessible worlds)
then one cannot be less informed at an informationally accessible world
than one is at the actual world. Identifying an agent’s basic data with a set
of formulae does not alter this, for sentences (and sets of sentences) pick
out the same semantic content at any world. Thus, in a sense, the problem
we face here is that the sentential interpretation does not allow us to look
beyond the informational content we ascribe to an agent when we model
that agent’s basic data and information.
13The formulation of the second condition does not refer to what is actually true, and
thereby also works if s settles an issue that is indeterminate at @. In the remainder of this
paper I shall nevertheless stick to the initial condition.
14This is just the well-known idea from non-normal modal logics that at non-normal
worlds anything is possible; see Priest [2001: 58–9].
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The moral of this result is that, even if we identify an agent’s basic
data and information with a set of formulae (a data or information-base),
we model it as a set of cognitive commodities which: (a) in the case of
data, picks out the same set of accessible worlds at all worlds, and (b)
in the case of information, picks out a subset of the actually accessible
worlds at all informationally accessible worlds. The latter suggests that, as
a means to individuate an agent’s basic data and information more finely
than by means of its semantical content, the sentential approach is not
entirely satisfactory. More exactly, the sentential approach works well as
long as it is confined to the actual world; where it effectively settles the
stronger independence thesis. This is because, as opposed to contents,
sets of sentences allow us to discriminate between the consequences of an
agent’s true data, and the true consequences of of an agent’s data. At non-
actual worlds, by contrast, this approach enforces too much, and at least
the most obvious ways to weaken it seem largely ad hoc.
5 two levels of information and the ktb-analysis
Characterising an agent’s basic data or information as a set of commodi-
ties is in no way confined to the sentential interpretation used in the pre-
vious section. As explained in Floridi [2005b] and exploited as a means to
characterise an agent’s information more finely in Allo [2009], data can be
understood at different levels. One natural level is given by the de dicto
reading of data, and sees data as a lack of uniformity at the level of sym-
bolic representation. The sentential approach described in the previous
section operates at this level. A less obvious level is given by the de re
reading, which sees data as a lack of uniformity in the world. This is by far
the most encompassing view of data, and gives us more control over how
we ascribe data and information to agents.
To exploit this more refined view we need a different procedure to eval-
uate what counts as an informationally accessible world. We start as we
did before by ascribing a set of basic data to each agent, but do not longer
require that all these data are effectively in a sentential or otherwise sym-
bolic form. If one thinks that at least an agent’s basic beliefs are stored in
some or other symbolic form (as presumed by the belief box metaphor), this
choice implies that the totality of an agent’s basic data does not coincide
with its basic beliefs. The ultimate nature of belief is, however, irrelevant
to the present discussion. We only need to be attentive to the fact that data
and beliefs are not only different things, but that they also do not have
to be stored in similar ways. As a working definition, we could stipulate
that holding a particular datum implies access to that datum, but does not
imply access to the content of that datum.
More important than the nature of de re data is the way we can formally
exploit its properties to give an interpretation to the pure semantics of sec-
tion 3. Let Ξ be a’s set of basic data. Now, let Γ be the adequate sentential
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expression of Ξ at the actual world. This coincides with a’s basic data as it
can be represented by a set of formulae. As before, a’s basic information
at the actual world can be identified as that part of Γ that is actually true,
call this ∆.15 Using the above characterisation of a’s basic information at
the actual world, the set of informationally accessible worlds can still be
identified with ‖∆‖. This account of basic information does not make a
significant difference for what is informationally accessible from the ac-
tual world. But how does it behave at non-actual informationally accessible
worlds? A natural way to understand an informationally accessible world
s, is as a world where ∆ is true, and a’s basic data still correspond to Ξ.
The first question which then arises is how the sentential expression of Ξ
at s, call this Γ ′, compares to Γ . The second question is which subset ofΓ ′ should qualify as a’s basic information at s. Of course, these questions
cannot be answered independently of each other, as our main aim is still to
vindicate the pure semantics set out in section 3.
	 	 	
Let us first look at how the de re reading of data affects the reflectivity
of being informed. The main drawback of the sentential approach is that
when Γ = Γ ′, we have ∆ ⊆ ∆′, and hence ‖∆′‖ ⊆ ‖∆‖ which is just the tran-
sitivity of informational accessibility. As a result, the failure of transitivity
is equivalent to ‖∆′‖ È ‖∆‖, and implies ∆ È ∆′. If, at least as a tempo-
rary assumption, we let ∆ and ∆′ be those subsets of Γ and Γ ′ that are true
at, respectively, @ and s, then the latter also implies Γ , Γ ′. As a result, to
characterise being informed as a veridical, but non-reflective state, it is nec-
essary that Ξ could have different sentential expressions at @ and at s, and
sufficient if it could have a logically weaker expression. This summarises
the first desideratum for an applied semantics for being informed.
The symmetry of informational accessibility can, by contrast, be shown
to coincide with the requirement that @ be in ‖∆′‖, and thus that ∆′ be that
subset of Γ ′ which is not only true at s, but also at @. This requirement can
be satisfied in several ways, either by tweaking the relation between ∆′ andΓ ′ (what qualifies as information at s), or between Ξ and Γ ′ (the sentential
expression of Ξ at s), or maybe even by revising the relation between Γ
and ∆ (what qualifies as information at @). Independently of how this is
actually achieved, this summarises the second desideratum for an applied
semantics for being informed. An applied semantics should, however, not
be reduced to the sheer compliance with these two desiderata; it should
also be explanatory.
	 	 	
Elsewhere I already argued for the relevance of cognitive commodities (pieces
of information), and the need to model these commodities in such a way
15Remark that the intermediate step where a sentential reformulation of a’s basic data is
given is indispensable, for mere de re data cannot themselves be qualified as true or false.
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that they do not uniformly pick out the same propositional contents at all
points of a modal space (Allo [2009: sect. 4, 8]). I won’t rehearse those
reasons here. All that needs to be emphasised is that the sentential model
of section 4 isn’t adequate when data are merely seen as constraining af-
fordances (Floridi [2005b: 3.2.1]). The general idea is this: Data, especially
those which are only specified as lacks of uniformity in the world, put an
agent who has access to these data in a position where she can be (or be-
come) informed of what is actually true. To see data as constraining affor-
dances means that they facilitate knowledge (or at least being informed).
The latter implies that seeing data in this open-ended way does not lead a
generalised relativism. In the terminology of Floridi [2008] “they limit the
possible models” (p. 325); in our terminology this means that they exclude
some worlds. Additionally, when we emphasise that they are merely affor-
dances, we mean that data do not have to fully determine what the agent
can be informed of. Even if they exclude worlds in a non-arbitrary way, the
set of worlds that are actually excluded depend on the context. Of course,
this is already true for one of the sentential models laid out in the previous
section: when one’s basic information is the truthful part of one’s basic
data, one’s basic information cannot but vary across the informationally
accessible worlds.
Treating data as constraining affordances presumably requires a further
dimension of variation: one that accounts for the relation between basic
data and their sentential expression. The only thing we need to note is that
there is no need for a full characterisation of the relation between de re
data and their sentential rendition. As long as it allows that the sentential
rendition of a set of basic de re data may vary in such a way that, when
moving from the actual world to an informationally accessible world, (i) an
agent’s basic information may change in such a way that it at least involves
an information loss, but (ii) could also not change in such a way that it
would lead to the exclusion of the actual world, any such relation will do.
	 	 	
By assembling the different pieces laid out above we can now define the
relation of being informed as follows:
1. Given an agent a who holds the basic data Ξ which at the actual world
can be expressed as Γ , we say that a is informed that φ whenever, in
virtue of its truth, ∆ qualifies as a’s basic information at the actual
world, and φ is true at all informationally accessible worlds (i.e. ‖∆‖).
2. For every informationally accessible world s ∈ ‖∆‖, the set Γ ′ is the
sentential expression of Ξ at s only if @ ∈ ‖∆′‖ and ∆′ is the truthful
part of Γ ′ at s. Thus, we say that a is informed that φ at s whenever
φ is true at all s′ ∈ ‖∆′‖.
To show that the present proposal fits the bill two things have to be argued
for. First, we have to show that the definition is such that the relation
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of informational accessibility is the kind of reflexive, symmetric, but non-
transitive relation that is also used in the pure semantics. Second, we have
to show that the present proposal is no longer a pure semantics, but that
(in particular) the failure of transitivity and the symmetry of informational
accessibility correspond to a real feature of (basic) data and information.
To comply with the pure semantics the above definition has to enforce
that @Ia@ and @Ias → sIa@ come out valid for all a ∈A, and that (sIas′ ∧
s′Ias′′) → sIas′′ has counterexamples for at least some a ∈ A. The first
one is straightforward, as it is implied by the demand that ∆ is a’s basic
information at the actual world only if @ is in ‖∆‖. To prove the second one,
assume for reductio that for some agent a, the world s is an informational
alternative to @, but that @ is not an informational alternative to s. This
means that where ∆ is a’s actual basic information, s belongs to ‖∆‖, and
a’s basic information at s; i.e. ∆′ is such that @ does not belong to ‖∆′‖. The
latter implies that the sentential expression of a’s basic data would have
been such that its truthful part at s would exclude the actual world, which
violates the condition for basic information at a non-actual informationally
accessible world.
Finally, to construct a counterexample for (s1Ias2 ∧ s2Ias3) → s1Ias3,
let Γi and ∆i stand for, respectively, a’s basic data and a’s basic informa-
tion at si. It has already been noted that any such counterexample would
have to imply ∆1 È ∆2, with ∆2 such that at least one φ implied by ∆1 is
not implied by ∆2. Furthermore, since validity has to be evaluated at the
actual world, the only relevant counterexamples to the transitivity of in-
formational accessibility are those where the base-world is the actual one
(i.e. s1 = @). Thus, we only need to verify that Γ2 can simultaneously have
a truthful part that is logically weaker than ∆1 and not exclude the actual
world. This condition is obviously satisfied since not excluding the actual
world only puts an upper bound on ∆1, but no lower bound.
	 	 	
None of the above already hints at more concrete interpretations of fail-
ures of the transitivity of informational accessibility or the non-exclusion
of the actual world. To a first approximation, my suggestion is that the
failure of transitivity is due to the potential opacity of de re data, whereas
the restriction on potential sentential expressions of de re data at informa-
tionally accessible worlds, which enforces the non-exclusion of the actual
world, can be seen as a means to capture the idea that pieces of information
encapsulate their truth.
Where Ξ is an agent’s basic de re data, Γ its sentential expression at the
actual world, and ∆ its truthful part, we should keep the following issues
apart: (a) the fact that Ξ potentially picks out a different set of sentences at
each world—this is a key-property of de re data as mere constraining affor-
dances; (b) the fact that informational accessibility is merely a function of
the truthful part of Γ—this is the key-property of informational accessibil-
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ity; and (c) the fact that further properties of the relation of being informed
can only be determined by putting further constraints on what may be an
admissible sentential expression of Ξ at the other informationally accessi-
ble worlds. Given that, let me suggest the following general principle which
any such constraint should comply with. Where s is an informationally ac-
cessible world, (i) Γ ′ is an inadmissible sentential expression of Ξ at s only
if (through the workings of ∆′; most likely the truthful part of Γ ′ at s) it
can be dismissed solely in virtue of what is actually true, and (ii) Γ ′ cannot
be inadmissible solely in virtue of its divergence from the actual sentential
expression of Ξ. What this principle suggests is that an agent’s actual state
of information does not have to be sensitive to how it is related to its basic
data—there is no subjective or epistemic limit to how de re data receive
their sentential expression—, but it should (or at least could) be sensitive
to what is actually the case—which is a purely objective limit.
Even when presented in this abstract fashion, the following should be
clear. First, where Γs is the sentential expression of Ξ at s, the lack of a
subjective constraint on how Ξ relates to Γs is already sufficient to lead
(at least potentially) to situations where an agent’s basic information at s
is indeed logically weaker than it’s basic information at the actual world.
As we’ve seen, this opens the door to failures of transitivity of informa-
tional accessibility, and does so in a way that is quite different from more
common such failures (in particular, the non-transitivity of the relation of
being not discriminable by a non-perfect epistemic agent, see: Williamson
[2000: chapt. 5]). This is for instance revealed by considering the non-
factive relation of holding data for φ, which, if defined as the truth of φ
at all worlds in ‖Γ‖ with Γ the sentential expression of Ξ, can be shown
to be non-reflective in virtue of the lack of a subjective constraint on ad-
missible sentential expressions. The latter shows that being informed is
a non-reflective state merely because it presupposes holding data that can
be represented in some or other sentential form, and holding data is it-
self non-reflective. Put differently, a de re datum is by its nature relatively
open-ended, and, because it might be opaque to the agent who has access
to that datum, this agent does not necessarily have the cognitive resources
to fully constrain this open-endedness.
Second, if there is an objective constraint or limit on the admissible sen-
tential expressions of Ξ, then, if suitably conceived, that could lead to the
symmetry of informational accessibility. The requirement that for any in-
formationally accessible world s, Γs could not be such that its truthful part∆s would rule out the actual world is exactly such a constraint. Admittedly,
this is all but a specific constraint on admissible sentential expressions. All
I have done is specify the minimal outcome that should be respected. Since
there is no need to be specific about what it means in general to be a sen-
tential expression of a de re datum, there is also no need to be any more
specific than what is required by the non-exclusion of the actual world. By
only specifying the required outcome, the symmetry of informational ac-
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cessibility is enforced in a minimal way. Rather than a lack of specificity,
this is in fact a positive feature which precludes the symmetry of infor-
mational accessibility from collapsing into something that might look like
an introspective feature. Unlike the non-reflectivity of being informed, the
non-exclusion of the actual world cannot be retraced to a feature of hold-
ing data.16 Also, because no known doxastic or epistemic logic depends on
an accessibility relation that is merely symmetric (and reflexive), the non-
exclusion of the actual world cannot either be regarded as a familiar feature
of knowledge that is merely presented in a less familiar guise.
6 concluding remarks
By understanding information as content that is not just true at the actual
world, but can also never exclude that actual world, a model-theory which
almost vindicates the KTB-analysis is obtained. Almost, that is, because the
resulting logic does not have to be a normal modal logic. As strong neces-
sitation was never explicitly defended, this does not pose a problem. The
model-theory in question is valuable because it warrants the independence
of the state of being informed. Information is not knowledge, because it
does not come with all the modal properties that are usually associated
with knowledge,17 and it is not belief, because it has to be true. More im-
portantly, information also does not coincide with true belief; something is
not information if it is derived from false data, and information privileges
the actual world by never excluding it.
The design of models for being informed remains a tricky exercise, es-
pecially if the resulting logic is fixed in advance. Two reasons can be given
for the difficulties we faced along the way. A first reason is that the sugges-
tion that information is truth-constituted cannot easily be integrated within
a standard Kripke-style semantics. This problem was solved by giving the
actual world a special significance, but this is at best a partial rendition
of the intimate connection between truth an information—it merely sim-
ulates the required behaviour within a Kripke-model. A second reason is
that when information is understood as true well-formed and meaningful
content such content is naturally perceived as a persistent commodity with
a determinate or world-independent semantic content. The latter, however,
implies a sort of monotonicity condition which immediately warrants the
transitivity of the informational accessibility relation. Being more specific
about the different kind of data an agent could have access to, leads to a
sound explanation of why this otherwise natural assumption of persistence
might fail.
16This might look odd, because it is specified as a constraint on the data one holds. Yet, it
does not have to be so, for the actual constraint might still only have an impact on that part
of the data which actually constitute information; it simply wasn’t defined that way.
17This does not entirely square with the analysis in Floridi [forthcoming], but the relevant
issue here is that being informed does not coincide with the usual externalist accounts of
knowledge.
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Arguably, the main contribution of this paper is that it makes an information-
based epistemology more plausible by showing that information can indeed
be a cognitively more valuable, rather than merely a different kind of factive
commodity than true belief. This is what the strong independence thesis
aims at. Because it relates the properties of being informed to the nature
of data and information, the proposed model-theory supports this thesis
in, what I believe is, a worthwhile and interesting way. Still, even if one
does not adhere to this broader aim, or if one believes that being informed
should be conceived according to the Dretskian orthodoxy, this paper also
offers a number of methodological insights that are of independent value.
These insights mainly concern the nature and pitfalls of logical modelling,
and is emphasised by showing that the original KTB-analysis could be seen
as an exercise in reverse engineering.
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